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Brazil	elections	2018:	could	a	lack	of	legitimacy	make
the	country	ungovernable?
Brazil’s	elections	in	October	2018	are	likely	to	see	unusually	high	levels	of	abstention.	With	legitimacy
undermined	both	by	the	vast	Lava	Jato	corruption	scandal	and	by	the	horse-trading	typical	of
Brazil’s	hotly	contested	political	system,	the	effectiveness	of	governance	is	likely	to	deteriorate	even
further,	writes	Mark	S.	Langevin	(George	Mason	University).
Democracies	are	often	rocked	by	wars	and	internal	conflicts	that	brew	up	dissonance,	clashes,	and
attacks	on	the	republican	rule	of	law.	Venezuela’s	steep	fall	into	arbitrary	rule	and	gut-wrenching	poverty	has	sunk
hopes	of	democratic	rule.	The	United	States	faces	a	democratic	test	under	President	Donald	Trump,	with	Russia’s
active	efforts	to	warp	the	US	electoral	process	and	Trump’s	efforts	to	undermine	the	rule	of	law	challenging	the
institutional	integrity	of	the	judiciary	and	the	legislature.	Brazilian	democracy	has	also	taken	a	beating	of	late.
Brazil	has	seen	protests	for	direct	elections	since	President	Temer’s	inauguration	(Marcelo
Camargo/Agência	Brasil,	CC	BY	2.0)
The	country	responded	to	the	2009	recession	with	counter-cyclical	policies	that	lessened	the	pain	and	protected	the
most	vulnerable,	but	a	perfect	storm	rumbled	into	Brasilia	in	2014,	smashing	the	economy	and	undercutting	the
legitimacy	of	Brazilian	democracy.
The	onset	of	economic	decline	coincided	with	revelations	from	the	Lava	Jato	corruption	task	force,	which	found	that
business	leaders	and	politicians	had	conspired	to	siphon	off	procurement	kickbacks	to	finance	political	parties	and
their	candidates.	The	scope	of	the	Lava	Jato	scheme	was	unprecedented,	but	the	existence	of	campaign	slush	funds
is	old	news	in	Brazil.
For	three	years,	the	recession	and	Lava	Jato	prosecutions	led	to	recriminations	that	reached	their	climax	with	the
2016	impeachment	of	former	president	Dilma	Rousseff	and	the	incarceration	of	the	Workers	Party	leader	and	former
president	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	earlier	this	year.
This	compounding	crisis	deepened	under	the	lame	duck	administration	of	President	Michel	Temer,	who	now	finds
himself	facing	rock	bottom	approval	ratings	and	serious	allegations	of	corruption.	Brazilian	democracy	is	teetering	on
the	brink	as	citizens	cautiously	await	October’s	general	elections.
Elections	and	democracy
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Brazil’s	New	Republic,	forged	in	the	transition	from	military	dictatorship	to	civilian	rule	during	the	1980s,	has	always
been	fiery	and	fragmented.
The	number	of	political	parties	and	representative	civil	society	organisations	grows	at	a	rate	of	knots.	Elections	are
passionately	contested.	According	to	the	Institute	for	Democracy	and	Electoral	Assistance,	during	the	past	three
decades	turnout	of	the	voting-age	population	has	reached	nearly	80	percent.	Voting	is	compulsory,	but	the	sanctions
for	abstention	rarely	dissuade	citizens.
Most	Brazilians	want	to	vote.	Invalid	votes,	both	blank	and	incorrectly	marked,	normally	comprise	five	to	ten	per	cent
of	the	total.	In	the	first	round	of	the	2014	elections	invalid	votes	reached	nearly	ten	per	cent	and	nearly	20	per	cent	of
the	voting-age	population	failed	to	show	up	at	the	ballot	box,	giving	an	effective	rate	of	abstention	of	nearly	30	per
cent.	Brazil’s	turnout	for	presidential	elections	ranks	above	average,	and	well	above	Mexico	(63%)	or	the	US	(65%),
but	it	could	fall	in	2018.
The	2016	municipal	elections	revealed	a	growing	–	if	unorganised	–	movement	for	abstention.	The	abstention	rate
for	the	second	round	of	the	2014	presidential	election	reached	27	per	cent,	increasing	to	32.5	per	cent	for	the	second
round	of	the	2016	mayoral	elections.
“Political	reform	now!”	Anger	against	the	political	system	is	reflected	in	growing
abstention	(Marcelo	Camargo/Agência	Brasil,	CC	BY	2.0)
In	recent	polling	for	the	2018	elections,	43	percent	of	respondents	planned	to	abstain	or	were	undecided.	Some	will
eventually	cast	a	valid	vote,	but	the	second	round	of	the	presidential	election	may	trigger	a	measurable	jump	in
effective	abstention,	which	would	radically	alter	the	electoral	terrain.
Normally	abstention	rates	drop	during	the	second	round,	but	this	year’s	contest	may	be	different.	The	winning
candidate	may	receive	fewer	votes	than	the	number	of	Brazilians	who	effectively	abstain.	High	levels	of	candidate
disapproval	could	push	second	round	abstention	well	beyond	a	third	of	the	voting-age	population.
According	to	the	latest	DataFolha	poll,	the	leading	candidates	also	face	significant	levels	of	voter	rejection.
The	conservative	nationalist	Jair	Bolsonaro	of	the	Social	Liberal	Party	(PSL)	ranks	highest,	with	39	per	cent	of
respondents	refusing	to	consider	voting	for	him.	Geraldo	Alckmin	of	the	Brazilian	Social	Democratic	Party	(PSDB)
follows	with	26	per	cent,	whereas	Marina	Silva	(Rede)	and	Ciro	Gomes	of	the	Democratic	Labor	Party	(PDT)	trail
with	25	and	23	per	cent	respectively.
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The	Workers	Party	candidate,	former	president	Lula,	is	just	behind	Bolsonaro	with	34	percent,	but	it	is	more	likely
that	his	running	mate	Fernando	Haddad	will	become	the	eventual	contender	for	the	PT,	since	Lula’s	conviction	on
corruption	charges	nullifies	his	candidacy	under	the	country’s	“clean	slate”	law.	Haddad	also	registers	comparable
rejection	by	voters.
More	interestingly,	Poder	360	reports	that	when	respondents	know	particular	candidates,	then	rejection	rates	soar.
For	example,	for	those	that	know	of	Bolsonaro,	69	percent	refuse	to	vote	for	him.	Essentially,	once	voters	get	to
know	the	leading	candidates,	rejection	rates	jump	to	the	sixtieth	percentile.
Bolsonaro	leads	the	pack	with	roughly	20	per	cent	approval	and	will	certainly	qualify	for	the	second-round	on	October
28,	but	his	high	disapproval	rating	may	send	many	voters	to	the	sidelines	if	they	refuse	to	consider	the	second-place
candidate.	Haddad	of	the	PT	is	another	favourite	to	make	it	into	the	second	round,	but	he	faces	a	57	per	cent
disapproval	rating	from	those	who	know	of	him.
Brazil’s	deepening	polarisation	and	sky-high	candidate	rejection	levels	make	it	increasingly	plausible	that	many
prospective	second-round	voters	may	decline	to	vote	due	to	their	rejection	of	both	candidates.
Brazilians	also	question	whether	October’s	elections	will	lead	to	better	governance.		The	1994	presidential	campaign
coincided	with	the	introduction	of	the	Real	Plan	that	ended	hyperinflation	and	led	to	a	huge	boost	in	the	approval
rating	of	its	key	proponent,	Minister	of	Finance	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso.	The	2002	campaign	saw	the
consummation	of	Lula’s	“Letter	to	the	Brazilian	People”,	which	made	it	a	policy	principle	that	the	federal	government
would	meet	the	basic	needs	of	every	Brazilian.
This	year’s	presidential	contenders	promise	a	lot,	but	voters	are	increasingly	suspicious	of	such	pledges.	Voters	are
disgusted	with	the	body	politic	and	distrust	politicians	and	their	parties.
Elections	and	legitimacy
In	theory,	October’s	elections	should	bring	much	needed	legitimacy	to	a	federal	government	shaken	by	corruption
scandals	and	presidential	impeachment.	However,	recent	DataFolha	polling	found	that	two-thirds	of	respondents
have	lost	confidence	in	congress	and	political	parties.
And	though	Brazilian	voters	will	elect	a	new	president	in	October,	it	appears	that	congressional	incumbents	still	hold
all	the	cards	when	it	comes	to	re-election.	Nearly	75	per	cent	of	elections	for	the	Chamber	of	Federal	Deputies	and
Senate	will	include	incumbent	contenders.	There	is,	however,	a	movement	underway	asking	voter	to	commit	to
voting	for	non-politicians	and	new	candidates.	Both	the	newly	established	political	party	Partido	Novo	and	the	social
movement	RenovaBR	have	promised	to	elect	a	set	of	new	faces,	but	they	are	up	against	entrenched	incumbency
and	well-established	party	machines.
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Many	of	Brazil’s	deputies	and	senators	are	well	ensconced	in	their	seats	(Jefferson
Rudy/Agência	Senado,	CC	BY	2.0)
Ironically,	the	Lava	Jato	corruption	scandal	and	its	links	to	major	Brazilian	enterprises	such	as	Odebrecht	has	led	to
the	enactment	of	a	ban	on	all	corporate	campaign	donations.	While	this	might	sound	positive,	the	measure	may
actually	assist	wealthy	Brazilian	candidates	willing	to	spend	their	own	money	while	newcomers	scramble	to	raise
funds.	Since	incumbents	also	tend	to	be	wealthy	by	Brazilian	standards,	this	also	favours	incumbency.
Elections	matter,	but	will	enough	new	faces	be	elected	to	push	the	new	congress	toward	greater	political	reforms	that
deepen	accountability	and	transparency	to	achieve	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	weary	Brazilians?
Elections	and	governability
National	leaders	need	legitimacy	to	govern	under	democratic	rule.	Legitimacy	is	gained	at	the	ballot	box,	but	it	must
also	be	tempered	through	good	governance	and	results-oriented	policymaking	in	the	long	term.	Brazilian	leaders	are
adept	at	fixing	short-term	political	snags,	but	governability	–	the	capacity	to	control	and	manage	a	given	society	–	has
sagged	in	recent	years.
Congress	as	well	as	state	and	local	governments	throughout	Brazil	have	struggled	to	legislate	and	ensure	fiscal
responsibility	amidst	a	growing	demand	for	better	public	services.	Gradual	improvements	in	public	services,	most
notably	health	and	security,	have	ground	to	a	halt.	The	recent	explosion	of	homicides	and	violence	is	the	bloody
expression	of	failed	governance,	and	it’s	dark	stain	has	tainted	Brazil’s	leading	political	parties.	No	one	is	innocent	in
Brasilia.
Elections	do	not	necessarily	improve	governability,	even	if	they	lend	legitimacy	to	elected	leaders.	The	next	Brazilian
president	may	struggle	with	congressional	cooperation.		Parties	and	parliaments	serve	to	aggregate	private	interests
into	public	policy	and	law,	but	with	nearly	30	parties	–	most	with	little	ideological	coherence	or	discipline	–	the
Brazilian	congress	cannot	do	this	effectively,	making	good	governance	a	distant	dream.	The	country’s	high	level	of
electoral	contestation	is	impressive,	but	the	political	debts	incurred	in	successful	election	campaigns	can	also
undermine	governability.
There	are	thirteen	candidates	vying	for	the	presidential	sash,	many	of	whom	share	similar	ideologies	and	policy
approaches.	The	first	round	of	the	presidential	election	is	hotly	contested,	with	four	or	five	contenders	holding	a
possible	ticket	to	the	second	round.	On	average,	there	are	over	16	candidates	for	each	seat	in	the	lower	house,	with
the	states	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	Sao	Paulo	having	nearly	24	candidates	per	race.
Contestation	legitimises	democracy,	but	it	can	also	divide	and	fragment	the	body	politic,	challenging	institutional
mechanisms	of	interest	aggregation	(such	as	parties	and	legislative	negotiations).	With	so	many	parties	and
candidates	vying	for	the	spoils	of	victory,	yet	confused	over	how	to	broker	alliances	and	trade	votes,	governability	is
weakened.		In	this	way,	contestation	can	blind	elected	officials	to	the	real	task	at	hand.
Worse,	the	challenge	of	the	legislative	process	coupled	with	high	levels	of	contestation	has	led	to	multiple	corruption
schemes	for	buying	congressional	votes	and	electing	allies.	The	Lava	Jato	scheme	is	just	the	latest	iteration	of
efforts	to	finance	electoral	campaigns.		With	so	much	competition	and	participation,	Brazilian	candidates	are	hard-
pressed	to	win	an	election	without	making	illicit	payments	to	gatekeepers	–	usually	local	politicians	and	their	activist
supporters	–	in	order	to	gain	access	to	organised	constituencies:	professional	associations,	labour	unions,	or
community	groups,	for	instance.	These	under-the-table	payments	require	illegal	slush	funds	financed	through
kickback	schemes	that	normally	involve	government	procurement	or	regulation.	Corruption	in	Brazil	thrives	where
accountability	and	transparency	are	absent.
The	elections	of	October	2018	are	just	the	first	step	along	a	thornier	path	towards	a	more	accountable	and
representative	democracy.	Brazilian	majorities	will	elect	their	president	and	governors,	but	only	small	pluralities	will
directly	elect	their	representatives	in	congress	and	state	assemblies	under	the	current	proportional	system.
The	first	order	of	business	for	the	next	congress	should	be	to	openly	debate	the	democratic	deficits	that	lead	to
corruption,	ineffective	governance,	and	deteriorating	public	services.	More	likely	than	not,	most	elected	officials	will
dodge	this	democratic	mandate.
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Brazilian	citizens	will	need	to	come	together	in	non-partisan,	independent	collective	action	to	push	the	country’s
wounded	democracy	towards	higher	ground.	Otherwise,	the	New	Republic	could	well	go	under.
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
Mark	S.	Langevin	–	George	Mason	University	
Mark	S.	Langevin,	Ph.D.	is	Senior	Fellow	at	the	Schar	School	of	Policy	and	Government,	George
Mason	University,	and	Director	of	Brazilworks.	He	can	be	reached	at	mark@brazilworks.net.
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